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ABSTRACT 
A relatively simple analysis of central banks pegging interest rates applies whenever prices 
are determined in a price-flexible model where the central bank pursues a singular price-
level or nominal-income target.  Applying the model empirically in the U.S. and find that 
prior to 1980, the Federal Reserve would have met its price-level or nominal-income targets 
best by using the M1 definition of money.  However, after 1982, the Federal Reserve would 
have more effectively met is targets by pegging the interest rate.  We also further the 
analysis in a general-equilibrium, cash-in-advance model with explicit state-contingent 
securities that complete markets. 
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The Inflation Dynamics of Pegging Interest Rates 
 
I. Introduction: 
The literature on “inflation dynamics,“ goes back to Sargent and Wallace (1975), Lucas 
(1976), and Sargent (1989), and continues through more recent work such as Woodford (2003).  
Much of that literature deals with the issue of a central bank pegging the interest rate.  Sargent 
and Wallace (1975) argued that a central bank pegging the interest rate to meet a price-level 
target
1 leaves prices indeterminate.  McCallum (1981) and Woodford (2003) argued that prices 
are determinate when the central bank pegs interest rates based on certain feedback rules based 
on either the price level or inflation rate such as Taylor’s (1993) rule.  The analyses of Sargent 
and Wallace (1975) and Woodford (2003) are based on Sargent’s (1979) precedent of solving 
expectational difference equations in economies with infinite horizons.  Sargent’s precedent is to 
solve any diverging expectational difference equation forward and assume its solution is 
bounded.  However, Eagle and Murff (2005) review Sargent’s analysis and (i) find that Sargent 
never did prove that his precedent works in all cases, (ii) find situations where Sargent’s 
precedent leads to incorrect solutions, and (iii) argue that Woodford’s (2003) use of Sargent’s 
precedent is fallacious; that in essence the veil of infinity hides the incompleteness of 
Woodford’s model of a cashless economy.  Also, Eagle (2005b) revisits the issue of price 
indeterminacy issue in light of Eagle and Murff’s (2005) findings. 
Our analysis does not address the issue of whether or not prices are determined when the 
central bank targets interest rates in an infinite economy; however, we do address for a finite 
                                                 
1 Actually, Sargent and Wallace (1975) start out with the central bank’s objective function involving prices and 
output.  However, as a result of their famous irrelevance principle that money supply cannot systematically affect 
output; the only variable remaining under the central bank’s control is the price level. - 2 - 
economy. Also, even for infinite economies when prices are flexible
2 and the central bank has a 
singular goal such as the price level or nominal income, then this paper’s analysis applies.  In 
addition to providing a new theoretical analysis for the inflation dynamics of pegging interest 
rates, this paper empirically applies that theoretical analysis to U.S. data between 1959 and 2004.  
Based on this analysis, we compile statistics on the one-step-ahead forecast errors between 1970 
and 2004 had the Federal Reserve pursued either a price-level or nominal-income target.  For this 
hypothetical analysis, the Federal Reserve uses either the money supply or the interest rate as its 
instrument.  We find that between 1970 and 1980, the forecast errors would have been less had 
the Federal Reserve targeted the M1 definition of money.  However, after 1982, the forecast 
errors would have been less had the Federal Reserve pegged the interest rate rather than the 
money supply. 
The next section clarifies the terminology distinctions between “pegging the interest rate” 
and “targeting the interest rate.”  Section III presents our analysis which is based on a Fisher-like 
equation, the same basic equation that forms the basis of other economists’ analyses (e.g., 
Wordford, 2003).  In addition to discussing the analysis in terms of equations, section III 
presents the analysis in graphical terms.  Section IV explains our empirical analysis and results.  
To validate the analysis theoretically, we add a cash-in-advance constraint to a finite-horizon 
pure-exchange Arrow-Debreu economy.  Section V briefly reviews the Arrow-Debreu pure-
exchange economy, whereas Section VI adds the cash-in-advance constraint and furthers the 
analysis.  In section VII, we summarize our findings and reflect upon our analysis and findings. 
 
                                                 
2 Our restricting the focus of this paper to price-flexible models should not be misconstrued as implying that we are 
claiming that prices are in fact flexible. - 3 - 
II. Terminology: 
We make the distinction between “pegging the interest rate” and “targeting the interest 
rate.”  In this paper, targeting refers to the central bank’s goal.  A central bank’s short-term goal 
may be in terms of the price level, the inflation rate, the output level, or the level of nominal 
aggregate demand.  Even so, the central bank may peg the interest rate in its attempt to achieve 
that short-term goal.  In this case, the nominal interest rate is not the short-term goal; instead, it is 
the instrument the central bank uses to try to meet its short-term goal.  This strategy is what we 
call “pegging the nominal interest rate.” 
On the other hand, a central bank may have long-term goals and choose to set the 
nominal interest-rate in the short-term to meet those long-term goals.  In such a situation, the 
central bank’s short-term goal may in fact be the nominal interest rate.   This strategy is what we 
call “targeting the nominal interest rate.” 
In the real world, “pegging the interest rate” and “targeting the interest rate” become 
blurred.  However, in theoretical modeling, the distinction is very important.  For example, 
consider a central bank that pursues price stability.  Two of the most important ways for a central 
bank to pursue price stability is either through price-level targeting or inflation targeting.  
Assume the central bank in our example targets the price level.  Define  t P ˆ  to be the central 
bank’s targeted price level at time t and 
*
t i  is the nominal interest rate set by the central bank.  
Let  ] | [
*
t t t i P E  be the central bank’s expectations at time t of the price level at time t, conditional 
on the nominal interest rate being pegged at 
*
t i .  If the central bank uses an interest-rate 
instrument to pursue a short-term price-level target, it would set the nominal interest rate 
*
t i  such 
that  t t t t P i P E ˆ ] | [
* = .  We call such a strategy by the central bank “short-term price-level targeting” - 4 - 
even though the central bank uses the nominal interest rate as its instrument in its attempt to 
achieve that short-term price-level target.
3 
On the other hand, assume the central bank sets 
*
t i  so that  n t n t t P P E + + = ˆ ] [  for some n>0.  
Thus, the central bank targets a long-term price level, but its only short-term target is the nominal 
interest rate itself.  We call such a strategy “short-term interest-rate targeting.”  Basically, we use 
the term “pegging the interest rate” whenever the central bank has some short-term goal other 
than the interest rate.  When the only short-term goal is to set the interest rate, we say the central 
bank is “targeting the interest rate.” 
 
III. Basic Analysis: 
  Our analysis is based on an Euler equation that Woodford (2003) refers to as a Fisher 
equation.  We present this Fisher-Euler equation as an equality of “expected bangs per buck” 
where a “buck” will be one unit of the currency in the economy, whether that currency be euros, 
yens, pounds, dollars, or whatever.  The following Fisher-Euler equation states that the marginal 
utility of consumption per “buck” this period must equal one plus the nominal interest rate times 



























  (1) 
where  t i  is the nominal interest rate,  t P  is the price level,  jt c  is individual j’s consumption at 
time t,  j b  is j’s time preference factor, and  ) ( jt j jt c U
t x  is individual j’s utility function at time t.  
                                                 
3 See the appendix in Eagle (2005b) for a technical correction of Sargent and Wallace’s objective function needed in 
order that  t t t t P i P E ˆ ] | [
* =  apply. - 5 - 
The term  jt x  is a positive random variable with mean 1 representing shocks at time t to 
individual j’s utility function.  Therefore,  ) ( jt jt jt c U¢ x  is individual j’s marginal utility of 
consumption at time t. 
  Woodford calls his version of (1) a Fisher equation because he rewrites it in a way where 
the nominal interest rate is related to expected inflation and a real expected return related to the 
expected marginal utilities of consumption.   (See Woodford, 2003, p. 71 and p. 79). 
  We rewrite (1) differently depending on whether the central bank targets the price level 




  When the central bank targets the price level, the relevant relationship is between the 
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m   (2) 
where we call  t m ~  the “P-Fisher coefficient”.  The “P” indicates that this relationship is more 










  (3) 
When the central bank targets the price level, (3) is the essence of how pegging the nominal 
interest rate affects the price level.  We refer to (3) as the “iP-Fisher Relationship.” 
                                                 
4 A central bank could target things other than the price level or nominal income.  However, we have chosen to 
focus this paper only on price-level target and nominal-income (or nominal-aggregate-demand) targeting. - 6 - 
  The equation of exchange states that MV=N=PY where M is the money supply, V is the 
income velocity
5 of money, N is nominal aggregate demand, P is the price level, and Y is real 
aggregate supply.   Assume  ) , , ( t t t t i V V h Y =  where Yt is a vector of other variables in the 
system that affect velocity, and ht is a stochastic term with mean zero..  Solving the equation of 






) , , ( h Y
= .  Substitution this into (3) and solving for 
M gives: 
) , , ( ) 1 (
~
t t t t
t t d






=   (4) 
We use 
d
t M  because we use (4) to determine the amount of money demanded for any particular 
nominal interest rate the central bank pegs.  We call (4) the P-Fisher M
d function.
6 
If we take the equation of exchange, MV=PY and solve for P, we get 
Y
MV
P = .  If we 
assume that real aggregate supply (Y) is given, then  [ ] [ ] M V
Y
M







￿ =  is the 
variance of the price level when the central bank sets the money supply.  On the other hand, (3) 
implies that  [ ] [ ]









 is the variance of the price level when the central bank targets 
the nominal interest rate.  Therefore, the variance of the price level will be the same for both the 
money supply and interest rate instruments when the following condition holds: 













= m   (5) 
                                                 
5 The term “income velocity of money” is really mislabeled as income is associated with aggregate supply not 
aggregate demand.  However, money times velocity equals nominal aggregate demand, which equals nominal 
income only in equilibrium. 
6 We are not saying that this is “the money demand function” that would be consistent with a demand function based 
on microeconomic principles.  - 7 - 
When the left side of (5) is less than the right side, then pegging the nominal interest rate will 
lead to more price stability than setting the money supply.  On the other hand, setting the money 
supply will lead to more price stability when the right side of (5) is less than the left side.  That 
the issue of which instrument leads to greater stability depends on the direction of the inequality 
of the two sides (5) is similar to Poole’s (1970) conclusion that the issue depends on the relative 
stability of the IS curve versus the relative stability of the LM curve. 
  To more generally determine which instrument is more effective, (5) should take into 
account a stochastic level of real aggregate supply.  This more general issue can more easily be 
analyzed in logarithmic form.  Taking the natural logarithm of both sides of (3) gives 
) 1 ln( ) ~ ln( t t t i p + + = m  where pt is ln(Pt).  The variance of pt conditional on a pegged it is then 
[ ] [ ] t t t t i i p | ) ~ ln( var | var m = .  Taking the logarithm of the equation of exchange gives mt + vt = 
pt + yt where mt =ln(Mt), vt=ln(Vt), and yt=ln(Yt).  Therefore, the variance of pt conditional on a 
set money supply is  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] t t t t t t t t t m y v m v m y m p | cov 2 | var | var | var - + = .  Therefore, in order 
for pegging the interest rate and setting the money supply to have equal effectiveness, the 
following condition must hold: 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] t t t t t t t t t m y v m v m y i | cov 2 | var | var | ) ~ ln( var - + = m   (6) 
If the left side of (6) is greater than the right side, then setting the money supply is more 
effective, whereas if the left side of (6) is less than the right side then pegging the interest rate is 
more effective. 
  Figure 1 shows how pegging the interest rate leads to price stability when the P-Fisher 
coefficient  t m ~  is stable even though velocity is unstable.  The graph in the upper left quadrant 
plots the P-Fisher M
d curve, which is stochastic because of the unstable velocity.  A decrease in 
velocity shifts the P-Fisher M
d curve to the left (an increase), whereas a velocity increase shifts - 8 - 
the curve to the right.  When the 
central bank pegs the nominal 
interest rate at 
*
t i , the quantity 
of money demanded will 
decrease (increase) when 
velocity increases (decreases).   
The graph in the lower left 
quadrant shows the N=MV 
relationship where N is nominal 
aggregate demand.  Since the slope of this relationship is velocity, an increase in velocity will 
pivot the N=MV curve counterclockwise (an increase), whereas a velocity decrease will pivot the 
curve clockwise.  Note that the shifts in the P-Fisher M
d curve and N-MV offset each other in 
this example, leading to the level of nominal aggregate demand being the same regardless of 
velocity.  The lower right quadrant of Figure 1 plots the equilibrium condition N=PY curve, 
whose slope is Y.  Since the level of nominal aggregate demand is unaffected by changes in 
velocity in this example, the price level is also unaffected. 
The upper right quadrant of Figure 1 summarizes the other three quadrants.  When the P-
Fisher coefficient is stable, the price level is invariant to changes in velocity when the central 
bank targets the nominal interest rate. 
Figure 2 shows how the central bank setting the money supply leads to price instability 
when velocity is unstable even though the P-Fisher coefficient  t m ~  is stable.  For a given money 
supply, the stochastic changes in velocity will cause nominal aggregate demand to fluctuate as 
H M   L M









Figure 1.  Why Pegging the Nominal Interest Rate can 
















+  Slope = Y 
Slope = velocity - 9 - 
shown in the lower left quadrant.  
In the right quadrant, the 
fluctuating nominal aggregate 
demand leads to fluctuating price 
levels when real aggregate supply 
remains the same. 
The upper quadrants of 
Figure 2 also shows why 
fluctuating velocity leads to price 
instability when the central bank sets the money supply.  For a given money supply M
*, the 
fluctuating P-Fisher M
d curves lead to instability in the interest rate which through the iP-Fisher 
curve means price instability. 
 
Nominal-Aggregate-Demand Targeting (Similar to Nominal-Income Targeting)
7 
The previous section analyzed pegging the interest rate under price-level targeting.  
However, Eagle and Domian (2003a and 2003b) argue that the central bank should target 
nominal income or nominal aggregate demand instead of price-level targeting.  This section 
discusses pegging the interest rate under nominal-aggregate-demand targeting.  What is relevant 
under nominal-aggregate-demand targeting is the relationship between the nominal interest rate 
and nominal aggregate demand.  Rewriting the Fisher-Euler equation (1) and replacing Pt with 
Nt/Yt, we get: 
                                                 
7 Nominal income is associated with nominal aggregate supply.  Since the theory we present is in terms of nominal 
aggregate demand, not nominal aggregate supply; we use the term “nominal-aggregate-demand targeting” rather 
than the term “nominal income targeting.” 
nominal interest rate 





Figure 2.  Price Instability Resulting from 
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m   (7) 
where we call mt “the N-Fisher coefficient”.  We use the “N” prefix because (7) is most 









  (8) 
When the central bank targets nominal aggregate demand, (8) is the essence of how pegging the 
nominal interest rate affects nominal aggregate demand.  We refer to (8) as the “iN-Fisher 
Relationship.” 
Substituting  t t t t t N i V M = Y ) , , ( h  into (8) and solving for Mt gives: 
( ) ) , , ( 1 t t t t
t d





=   (9) 
We call (9) the N-Fisher M
d function as it will determine the quantity of money demanded when 
the central bank targets nominal aggregate demand.
8 
  Since N=MV,  [ ] ( ) [ ] M V M M N | var | var
2 = .  Taking the variance of both sides of (8) 














.  Therefore, the variance 
of nominal aggregate demand will be the same for both the money supply and interest rate 
instruments when the following condition holds: 
















= m   (10) 
                                                 
8 In fact (4) and (9) are the same because  t t t Y m m ~ = .  However,  t m is likely to be more stable under nominal 
aggregate demand targeting than is  t m ~ , whereas  t m ~  is likely to be more stable under price-level targeting than is 
t m .  This is discussed later in the paper. - 11 - 
When the left side of (10) is less 
than the right side, then pegging 
the interest rate will lead to 
more stability in the level of 
nominal aggregate demand than 
will setting the money supply.  
On the other hand, setting the 
money supply will lead to more 
such stability when the right 
side of (10) is less than the left 
side.  As opposed to (5), equation (10) is very general and applies even when real aggregate 
supply is stochastic. 
  Figure 3 shows how pegging the interest rate leads to stability in nominal aggregate 
demand when the N-Fisher coefficient  t m  is stable even though velocity is unstable.   Similarly, 
Figure 4 shows how setting the money supply leads to instability in the level of nominal 
aggregate demand under the same conditions.  Because these graphs are similar to those in 
Figures 1 and 2, we consider them to be self explanatory. 
 
IV. Emirical Results: 
  In the previous section, we identified the conditions that determine whether the central 
bank’s instrument should be the interest rate or the money supply.  In this section, we apply the 
analysis of the previous section to address this issue empirically. 
H M   L M







Figure 3.  Why Pegging the Nominal Interest Rate Can Precisely 
Determine Nominal Aggregate Demand (NAD) When Velocity is 

















+  Slope=velocity - 12 - 
First, consider price-level targeting.  According to the analysis of the previous section, if 
the central bank uses the interest rate as its instrument, it should use equation (3) to do so.  If its 
price target is 
*
t P , then it should set its pegged interest rate 
*












= + .  (11) 
While the P-Fisher coefficient  t m ~  can vary over time,  t m ~  depends on the expectations of the 
future as is shown in (1).  From (3) and (11), we conclude that if the central bank were to target 















  (12) 
where  t P
~
is price level that would have resulted had the central bank targeted the interest rate.  
However, we only will observe 
the pegged interest rate if the 
central bank is in fact pegging 
the interest rate.  As a result, 
instead of (12), we measure 








] ~ [ ~
1 m m
 where it is actual 
3-month Treasury-Bill rate.
9  
The difference between (12) 
                                                 
9 Since our analysis is quarterly, we use the average of the 3-month T-bill rates for the last month of the previous 
quarter and the 3-month T-Bills for first two months of the present quarter as reported by the Federal Reserve. 





Figure 4.  Why Setting the Money Supply Leads to Instability in 
Nominal Aggregate Demand (NAD) when Velocity is Unstable, but 
the iN-Fisher Curve is Stable. 
N-Fischer 
M



















PH - 13 - 
and this measure should be very insignificant.  We next divided these forecast errors the current 
price level so that these would represent percentage one-step-ahead forecast errors.  By (3), we 
can write this percentage measure as: 

























] ~ [ 1 1 m m
  (13) 
  We estimate  ] ~ [ 1 t t E m -  by assuming that the central bank’s and public’s expectation of  t m ~  
is based on past values of  t m ~  as shown below: 
[ ] ￿ ￿
= =






~ ~ ~ ~
k s
st s k t k t t D a b E m m   (14) 
where the Dqt variables are seasonal dummies.  Since one does observe past interest rates and 
past price levels, one can determine the past P-Fisher coefficients using equation (3). 
For comparison purposes, we also estimated the one-step-ahead forecast errors had the 
central bank set the money supply instead.  The equation of exchange is  t t t t Y P V M = .  Solving 





M P = .  To pursue its price-level target of 
*
t P , the central bank would set the 









t t t Y
V
E M P 1
* * .  Therefore, the one-step-ahead forecast errors of prices 
if the central bank uses the money supply instrument rather than the interest rate instrument 

























M P P 1
* * ~ ~
 where  t P
~ ~
 is the price level that would have resulted had 
the central bank used the money supply as its instrument rather than the interest rate.  However, 
if the central bank did not set the money supply, we cannot observe its theoretical value.  

























M 1  as a proxy measure of these one-step-ahead forecast errors - 14 - 








































- - -   (15) 
We assume that the central bank’s and public’s expectations of the ratio of velocity to 
real aggregate supply is given by: 
￿ ￿
= =






















E a b   (16) 
Where et is the one-step-ahead percentage forecast error at time t, the term “standard one-








  (17) 
where this statistic pertains to the period from t=1 to t=n.  We used (13) and (14) to estimate the 
OSA % forecast errors, and then use (17) to compute the std. OSA% forecast error to represent 
the hypothetical situation of the central bank pegging the interest rate as it targeted the price 
level.  We use (15) and (16) and (17) to compute the std. OSA% forecast error that represents the 
hypothetical situation of the central bank setting the money supply as it targeted the price level.  
We use Ordinary Least Squares to estimate the initial conditions of (14) and (16) for the period 
from 1959 through the fourth quarter of 1959.  From 1970 on, we estimate the OSA % forecast 
errors and then re-estimate the coefficients of (14) and (16) to reflect the new information. 
Table 1 reports this analysis for the monetary instruments of the interest rate (the 3-month 
T-bill rate), and the M1, M2, and M3 definitions of money.  In bold is the instrument with the 
lowest std. OSA% forecast error for the period analyzed.  During the 1970s, Table 1 indicates 
that the central bank setting the M1 definition of money would have minimized the standard one-- 15 - 
step-ahead forecast error in the price level.  However, the M1’s std. OSA% forecast error is not 
statistically significantly less than it would have been had the central bank pegged the interest 
rate.  (We later explain how we determine statistical significance.) 
Because the rather turbulent time from 1980-1982 can be considered a fairly turbulent 
time, it may be more appropriate to consider the time after 1982 rather than the time after 1980.  
Also, the effects of DICMCA of 1980 may have needed some time for the economy to adjust to 
it.  After 1982, the central bank would have minimized the standard one-step-ahead forecast error 
by targeting the interest rate rather than any money supply measure.  In fact, the 0.55% standard 
OSA% forecast error for interest rate targeting is statistically significantly less than the std. 
OSA% forecast error for the M3 definition of money, which had the second lowest std. OSA% 
forecast error. 
We also empirically studied the relative effectiveness of monetary instruments when the 
central bank targets nominal income or nominal aggregate demand.  The OSA forecast error 
















t N  is the targeted nominal aggregate demand and  t N
~
 is the 
level of nominal aggregate demand that would have resulted had the central bank pegged the 
interest rate.  Using the actual interest rate instead of what the central bank would have targeted 
instrument  1970:1 to 2004:4  1970:1 to 1979:4  1980:1 to 2004:4  1983:1 to 2004:4 
interest rate  1.47%  0.95%  1.63%  0.55%** 
M1  1.05%  0.74%  1.14%  1.05% 
M2  0.88%  1.07%  0.80%  0.78% 
M3  0.85%
  1.07%  0.75%
  0.78% 
 
Table 1: Standard One-Step-Ahead GDP-Deflator % Forecast Error by Period and Instrument - 16 - 
it to be and then dividing by the price level and using (8) gives the following measure of this 














  (18) 
  Similar to what we did under price-level targeting, we assumed: 
[ ] ￿ ￿
= =







st s k t k t t D a b E m m   (19) 
For the central bank setting the money supply while pursuing a nominal-aggregate-demand 
target, we measured the one-step-ahead percentage forecast errors by 
[ ] ( ) [ ] t t t t t t t t N V E N V E V M / 1 / 1 1 - - - = -   (20) 
and we assumed that the central bank’s and public’s expectations of velocity is given by: 










st s t k t t D V V E a b   (21) 
In summary, we used (18), (19), and (17) to determine the std. OSA% forecast error that would 
have applied had the central bank pegged the interest rate as it pursued a nominal-aggregate-
demand target.  We used (20), (21), and (17) to determine the std. OSA% forecast error that 
would have applied had the central bank set the money supply instead as it pursued a nominal 
aggregate-demand target. 
  Table 2 presents the std. OSA % forecast errors for Nominal GDP for different periods 
and for different instruments.  In the 1970s, the M1 definition of money would have provided the 
instrument  1970:1 to 2004:4  1970:1 to 1979:4  1980:1 to 2004:4  1983:1 to 2004:4 
interest rate  2.01%  1.48%  2.18%  0.76% 
M1  1.35%  1.22%***  1.40%  1.24% 
M2  1.19%  1.40%  1.08%  0.90% 
M3  1.13%
+++  1.39%  1.01%
+++  0.91% 
+++ means significant at the 1% level for a special bootstrapping testing (See Table 3 for more details) 
Table 2: Standard One-Step-Ahead Nominal GDP % Forecast Error by Period and Instrument - 17 - 
lowest std. OSA% forecast error, which was 1.22%.  This was statistically significantly less than 
the 1.48% std. OSA% forecast error, that pertains to if the central bank had pegged the interest as 
it pursued nominal-aggregate-demand targeting.  After 1982, pegging the interest rate resulting 
with a lower std. OSA% forecast error, although it was not statistically significantly less. 
  To assess the significance of the differences, we employed a bootstrapping method.  The 
null hypothesis was that the central bank will experience the same std. forecasting error 
regardless whether it pegged the interest rate or targeted the money supply.  We first formed a 
distribution of the possible OSA% forecasting errors by pooling the OAS% forecasting errors 


















vs. interest rate 





















0.15%***  0.02%***  0.42%*** 
1970:1 to 
1979:4 
NAD  M1 
vs. interest rate 
28.21%  37.94%  10.43% 
1982:1 to 
2004:4 
NAD  interest rate*** 
vs. M1 
0.84%***  0.00%***  2.65%** 
1982:1 to 
2004:4 
NAD  interest rate 
vs. M2 
26.85%  23.64%  29.70% 
1982:1 to 
2004:4 
NAD  interest rate 
vs. M3 






vs. interest rate 
48.63%  61.33%  0.01%*** 
1970:1 to 
2004:4 
NAD  M3 
vs. interest rate 






vs. interest rate 
31.22%  46.77%  0.00%*** 
1980:1 to 
2004:4 
NAD  M3 
vs. interest rate 
46.73%  60.38%  0.00%*** 
 
Table 3: Bootstrapping P-values. - 18 - 
30,000 computations of a pair of std. OSA% forecasting errors and then computed the percent of 
those computations where the difference of the std. OSA% forecasting errors were equal to or 
greater than those that were observed in each case.  The percentages resulting from these 
simulations, we treat as the P-values for the tests of the null hypothesis that the true std. OSA% 
forecasting errors are the same. 
  Table 3 presents the results of this bootstrapping.  In addition to the bootstrapping where 
we combined both sets of OSA% forecasting errors in the pool, we also looked at the 
bootstrapping results when we kept the forecasting errors separate and used one of the separate 
pools (but not both)., 
 
V. Review Of An Arrow-Debreu Pure-Exchange Economy: 
Section III discussed our theoretical analysis and Section VI used our theoretical analysis 
to empirically investigate which instrument, the interest rate or the money supply, would have 
better served the Federal Reserve in its price-level targeting or nominal-aggregate-demand 
targeting.  However, until readers see this analysis applied to a general equilibrium model, they 
may be skeptical of the analysis’ validity.  This section briefly reviews a standard Arrow-Debreu 
pure exchange economy without storage consisting of one nonstorable consumption good.  
Section VI then adds the cash-in-advance constraint to this model and then furthers the analysis 
of section III. 
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where  0 j c  is j’s consumption at time 0,  jst c  is j’s consumption in state s at time t, b is the time 
discount factor, and  st p  is the probability of state s occurring at time t.  The T represents the last 
period of the economy and St is the number of possible states at time t. The functions  ) ( 0 0 j j c U  
and  ) ( jst jst c U  are continuous, twice differentiable, strictly concave, and strictly increasing.  To 
rule out corner solutions, assume  +¥ = ¢ = ¢
® ® ) ( lim ) ( lim
0 0 0 c U c U jst c j c .  The time frame for the s 
subscript is determined by the t subscript next to the s subscript.  For example, the s in  1 js c  refers 
to one of the possible states that can occur at time 1.  For notional convenience, we assume a 
common time discount factor b. 
At time 0, consumers can buy or sell state-contingent securities.  These state-contingent 
securities are prepaid securities where the buyer pays the seller the price of the security at time 0.  
Let  jst x  represent individual j’s demand at time 0 for the state-contingent security that delivers 
one consumption good at time t iff state s occurs at time t.  Define  st W  so that the price of this 
security equals  st st P W p 0 .   With it so defined,  st W  represents the real pricing kernel. 
Each consumer j chooses  jst x  for all s and t to maximize (22) subject to: 
0 0
1 1
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( ) jst jst st jst st x y P c P + =   (24) 
where (24) applies for all states s=1,2,…,St for all t=1,2,…,T where St is the finite number of 
states of nature at time t. 






















states s at time t and for t=1,2,…T, where the aggregate supply of the consumption good is - 20 - 
represented by  0 Y  at time 0 and  st Y  in state s at time t respectively.  Consumer j’s optimization 
problem is satisfied when 
st st
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 for all s=1,2,…,St and for all 
t=1,2,…,T, which implies that 
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  (25) 
The left side of (25) is the real pricing kernel and the right side is the intertemporal marginal rate 
of substitution.  Some literature mistakenly defines the pricing kernel as the intertemporal 
marginal rate of substitution (See, for example, Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay, 1997, p. 294).  
The equality between the real pricing kernel and the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution 
shown in (25) is an equilibrium condition, not a definition. 
  Since this is a standard one-good Arrow-Debreu pure-exchange economy with well 
behaved utility functions, a unique competitive equilibrium exists and that competitive 
equilibrium is Pareto efficient.  Also, the following property holds: 
Consumption-Aggregate-Supply Invariance Property: Let 1 and 2 represent any two 
different states of nature.  If real aggregate supply and each consumer’s utility function Ujst(.) is 
the same in both states of nature (i.e., there are no utility shocks), then every individual’s 
consumption will be the same in both states of nature. 
Proof by contradiction.  Assume there is some consumption allocation in a competitive 
equilibrium where for some states 1 and 2, each consumer’s utility function is the same 
for both states 1 and 2, Y1t=Y2t, and there are two individuals j and k such that  t j t j c c 2 1 <  
and  t k t k c c 2 1 > .  Since this is an Arrow-Debreu competitive equilibrium, the consumption 
allocation must be Pareto efficient.  Define  ( ) t j t j t j c c c 2 1 2
1
1
~ + º  and  ( ) t k t k t k c c c 2 1 2
1
1
~ + º .  
Define a new consumption allocation where for all consumers, for all states of nature, and 
for all time periods, the new consumption equals the old consumption except that j’s 
consumption in states 1 and 2 are both  t j c 1
~ and k’s consumption in states and 2 are both 
t k c 1
~ .  The new consumption allocation is obviously feasible since the original allocation - 21 - 
was feasible.  Because both j and k are strictly risk averse, they are both better off with 
this new consumption allocation.  However, that contradicts the statement that the 
original consumption allocation is Pareto efficient.  We, therefore, conclude that the 
consumption allocation must be the same as long as neither aggregate output nor the form 
of the utility functions changes.  Q.E.D. 
 
In the next section, we add a cash-in-advance constraint to an Arrow-Debreu economy 
which causes consumers to hold money during the period but not between periods.  We also add 
consumers’ holding nominal bonds.  However, in order for consumers to choose to hold nominal 
bonds, they must either expect to receive or pay nominal subsidies or taxes.  In other words, the 
only reason consumers hold nominal bonds in the following economy is to hedge against the 
nominal risk they face from nominal subsidies or taxes.  Such a conclusion follows directly from 
the consumption-real-aggregate-supply invariance property.  In the model that follows the central 
bank will be able to make changes in nominal aggregate demand even when real aggregate 
supply does not change.  However, the consumption-real-aggregate-supply invariance property 
states that if real aggregate supply does not change, then the consumption allocation must stay 
the same.  Nominal contracts expose both parties to the risk that nominal aggregate demand will 
change when nominal real aggregate supply does not change.  Therefore, the only reason a 
consumer would choose to hold a nominal contract is to hedge against another nominal contract.  
For example, a consumer expected to pay nominal taxes in the future will buy a nominal bond to 
hedge against the nominal risk.  Similarly, a consumer expecting to receive nominal subsidies in 
the future would issue a nominal bond to hedge against this nominal risk. 
VI. Adding A Cash-In-Advance Constraint to An Arrow-Debreu Economy: 
We add a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint similar to Lucas (1982).  However, we 
assume that there are both cash transactions and credit transactions.  Sometimes it is more - 22 - 
convenient to make a cash transaction and other times it is more convenient to make a credit 
transaction where one in essence borrows the money for the transaction concurrently with the 
spending of that money.  To make the notion of “convenience” well defined in the model, 
assume that for some transactions there is no transactions cost for using cash, but there is a 
positive and significant transactions cost for using credit.  For other transactions, there is a 
positive and significant transactions cost for using cash, but there is no transactions cost for using 
credit.  As a result, consumers will always use the approach for which there is no transactions 
cost. 
The fraction of the transactions for which cash is more convenient equals 
( ) st st st t Y i f e + ) , ( .  The error term  st e  is stochastic with mean zero, and is serially uncorrelated.  
Therefore, the cash-in-advance constraint for each consumer j will equal: 
( ) jst st st st st t jst c P Y i f M e + ³ ) , (   (26) 
Under the assumptions we make, (26) will in fact hold with equality.  
The timing of the information at the very beginning of this economy is very important.  
At the very beginning, all variables except the money supply and velocity are known.  That is the 
time when the central bank must decide what to do.  It must announce the interest rate if it pegs 
the interest rate, and it must announce the money supply if it pegs the money supply.  The central 
bank is unaware of the realized value of velocity when it pegs the money supply or the interest 
rate.  A second later, after the central bank has announced its money-supply or interest-rate peg, 
consumers become aware not only of the central bank’s announcement, but also the fraction of 
the value of their consumption transactions that will be more convenient in cash than in credit. 
The consumers then acquire the money they will need, buy and sell securities, which include - 23 - 
state-contingent securities, and nominal bonds.  They therefore acquire the exact amount of cash 
they will need. 
When the consumers undertake credit transactions, instead of spending money they issue 
nominal bonds in exchange for the goods.  Since they know at the beginning of the period how 
much their credit-transactions that period will be, they take this into account at the beginning of 
the period in the regular credit market.  For example, suppose a consumer wanted to hold neither 
a negative nor positive position in nominal bonds from the current period to the next period, but 
she knows she will buy 100 “bucks” worth of goods on credit.  She, therefore, buys 100 “bucks” 
worth of nominal bonds at the beginning of the period so that her net position in nominal bonds 
would be zero at the end of the period. 
Since consumers know the amount of cash they will need, the amount of money they 
choose to hold at the beginning of the period will equal the amount they will need as long as the 
nominal interest rate is positive (which we will assume that it is).
10  With no money being held 
between periods, and no transactions costs being incurred; there will be no distortions to the 
Arrow-Debreu economy.
11 
Given one’s information, consumer j’s optimization problem at time 0 is to maximize 
(22) subject to: 
{ } ( ) 0 0 0
1 1
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= =
e   (27) 
                                                 
10 The assumption that the nominal interest rate is an assumption of a result of the model.  We do need to be careful 
with such an assumption as it does restrict the more basic assumptions underlying the model.  The reason we need 
this assumption is the well recognized problem of money in models where people will choose to hold money instead 
of nominal bonds when the nominal interest rate is negative.  A negative nominal interest rate therefore impinges on 
the economy’s ability to move to Pareto efficiency.  So that we do not get distracted on this long-standing difficult 
issue, we just assume that it does not apply to any economy we are considering here. 
11 We purposely made the assumptions in the manner that we did so that we would have a stochastic velocity in an 
economy where there is no distortion on the Arrow-Debreu economy.  That way the Pareto-efficiency results of the 
Arrow-Debreu economy extend to the economy with money added. - 24 - 
{ } ( ) ) 1 ( ) ( ) , ( 1 1 , 1 , - - + + + + = + + - + t js t js jst jst jst st jst jst st st st st t jst i B Z x y P B c P Y i f M e   (28) 
and (26) where (26) and (28) apply for all states s at time t and for t=1,2,...,T. 
Equation (28) is the budget constraint for each period except time 0.  The consumers 
receive funds from four sources: (i) the value of his/her endowment in period t, (ii) the value of 
the state-contingent securities he/she purchased at time 0 that matures at time t, (iii) the nominal 
subsidies they receive (negative subsidies are taxes)., and (iv) the principal and interest from 
nominal bonds they held from the previous period.  For periods t=1,2,...,T; the consumer spends 
those funds on either goods or nominal bonds.  For the cash transactions, the consumer uses the 
funds to obtain money at the beginning of the period.  The value of these cash transactions equals 
( ) jst st st st st t c P Y i f e + ) , ( .  The consumer invests the rest of the funds into nominal bonds.  The 
amount of these nominal bonds purchased at the beginning of the period equals 
{ } ( ) jst jst st st st st t B c P Y i f + + - e ) , ( 1 .  When the consumer engages in the credit transactions, he/she 
issues bonds equal to the value of the credit transactions, which equals 
{ } ( ) 0 0 0 0 ) , ( 1 j st o c P Y i f e + - .  Note that the variable Bjst is the net amount of nominal bonds j holds 
from period t to period t+1. 
Equation (27) is consumer j’s budget constraint for time 0.  This is basically the same as 
(28) with two differences.  First, the consumer issues or purchases state-contingent securities at 
time 0.  Second, there are no bonds carried over from before time 0 because the economy did not 
exist prior to time 0. 
Prices are determined in this finite economy.  By working with a finite economy we 
avoid the controversial debate between Eagle and Murff (2005) and Sargent and Wallace (1975), 
Sargent (1978), Woodford (2003).  With a finite economy, there can be no interest rate in the 
final period as there is no future period with which to borrow or lend.  As a result, the central - 25 - 
bank has no choice but use the money supply in that final period.  Setting the money supply in 
that final period will determine price by the aggregate of (26) holding with equality.  If the 
central bank pegged interest rates prior to time T, then we can use (3) or (8) working backwards 
in time with expectations operators to conclude that prices will be determined. 
To avoid confusion, it is important that the taxes and subsidies to the Arrow-Debreu 
economy of the previous section do not redistribute wealth and do not interject any risk other 
than nominal risk.  An easy way to achieve these results is by assuming that for all consumers j, 
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j r .  What 
(29) means is that regardless whether or not the government taxes or pays subsidies, consumer 
will always receives the same fraction of those taxes or subsidies.  That this condition leads to no 
wealth redistribution is clear in the proof of the following proposition: 
The Nominal-Hedging Proposition: Under the above assumptions, the CIA 
consumption allocation is Pareto efficient and the following conditions hold: 
0 0 j j Z B =   (30) 
) 1 ( 1 , 1 , - - + + = t js t js jst jst i B Z B   (31) 
Proof: Subtracting (30) from (27) and recognizing that (26) holds with equality gives 
(23).  Subtracting (31) from (28) and recognizing that (26) holds with equality gives (24).  
Therefore, the consumers’ optimization problem of this section’s CIA economy is the 
same as that in the previous section’s Arrow-Debreu economy.  Hence, the consumption 
allocations in this section’s CIA economy are the same as in the previous section’s 
Arrow-Debreu economy.  Since the previous section’s Arrow-Debreu consumption 
allocation was Pareto efficient so must be the consumption allocation resulting from this 
section’s CIA economy under these assumptions.   
 - 26 - 
Remaining to show is that (30) and (31) are feasible for the government as well as for 
consumers.  Recognize that the government’s budget constraints for period 0 and for any 
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Substituting (29) into (30) and (31) and then summing over all consumers shows that (32) 
and (33) hold, meaning the government’s budget constraints hold.  Q.E.D. 
 
The Nominal-Hedging Proposition shows that the only reason that consumers hold 
nominal bonds between periods in this model is to hedge against the nominal-aggregate-demand 
risk in the nominal taxes and subsidies.  By the Consumption-Real-Aggregate-Supply Property 
of the previous section, the Pareto-efficient consumption allocation remains unchanged when 
real aggregate supply remains unchanged as long as no utility shocks occur and no wealth 
redistribution takes place.  Therefore, Pareto-efficient consumption should be unaffected by 
changes in nominal aggregate demand.  Therefore, in the absence of government taxes and 
subsidies, then the consumers would neither hold nor issue nominal bonds in equilibrium.  
However, if the government issues nominal taxes or nominal subsidies, consumers will choose to 
issue or hold nominal bonds to offset the nominal risk they face in the nominal taxes or nominal 
subsidies. 
  The preceding analysis is very revealing about the common completes-market 
assumption made by monetary economists such as Woodford (2003).  If markets are truly 
complete, then monetary policy cannot have any real positive impact on the economy unless it 
redistributes wealth.  The only way that monetary policy can result in a Pareto improvement in 
the economy is if markets are incomplete.  The logic behind these statements is simple.  If 
markets are complete, then the resulting allocation is Pareto efficient, which means a - 27 - 
Pareto improvement is impossible.  Thus, if we believe that monetary policy can affect Pareto 
efficiency, then monetary policy can only do so when markets are incomplete.  This means that 
any role for monetary policy to make Pareto improvements must be in its ability to help complete 
markets.  For monetary economists to argue that they will let other financial markets deal with 
the incompleteness of markets so that monetary policy can focus on its “true” role is a non 
sequitur.  The only possible Pareto-efficiency role of monetary policy is to help complete 
markets, to help make contracts behave in a manner consistent with complete markets.  See 
Eagle (2005a) and Eagle and Domian (2005a and 2005b) for a discussion of the role of monetary 
policy in completing markets. 
  Since markets are complete in the model of this section, the resulting consumption 
allocation is Pareto-efficient regardless of monetary policy.  Since nominal contracts expose one 
to the risk that the real payments on the nominal contracts will change when nominal aggregate 
demand changes even though neither changes in real aggregate supply nor utility shocks occur.  
That nominal exposure then would violate the Consumption-Aggregate-Supply-Invariance 
Property of the previous section.  As a result, the only reason consumers would choose to enter 
nominal contracts when markets are complete would be to hedge against other nominal contracts.  
In a model with complete markets, other contracts will dominate the nominal contracts for non-
hedging purposes.  In this model, the state-contingent securities will dominate the nominal 
contracts as the state-contingent securities will be able to identify changes in nominal aggregate 
demand in their different states.  On the other hand, under the assumptions in Eagle and Domian 
(2005a and 2005b), quasi-real contracts complete the markets and therefore dominate nominal 
contracts.  Under more general assumptions, Eagle (2005a) shows that quasi-real contracts in 
conjunction with three other types of contracts can approximately complete markets.  In an - 28 - 
economy with nominal contracts instead of quasi-real contracts, Eagle (2005a) shows that 
monetary policy can help complete markets by the central bank targeting nominal aggregate 
demand. 
  While monetary policy does not have Pareto impacts in this model, it nevertheless does 
have inflation impacts, which is the subject of this paper.  These inflation impacts are as 
discussed in the analysis of section III.  We now further that analysis as it applies to the model of 
this section.  We will begin this discussion by looking to the utility function (22) being 
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Multiplyint by cjst , summing across all consumers, noting that the sum of all consumption equals 
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jst =   (37) 
This is the result that forms the basis of the analysis by Eagle and Domian (2005b). - 29 - 
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This implies that  ] [ t t t E m m = , which means the central bank and the public know  t m  with 




























.  In other words, the central bank is able to perfectly 
meet its nominal aggregate-demand target. 
  This is even clearer when we assume that 
*








, which is clearly a constant when the public knows the central bank’s nominal-
aggregate-demand targets. 
  This result of the central bank being able to perfectly target nominal aggregate 
demand does apply more generally than just the logarithmic utility function.  Let  r  be the 
weighted average of consumers coefficients of relative risk aversion where each consumer’s 
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where  jt r ~  is consumer j’s coefficient of relative risk aversion at time j. - 30 - 
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m  where 
we added “~” marks to consumption to show that this is Pareto-efficient consumption; this 
symbolization is consistent to that in Eagle (2005a).  Taking the partial derivative of  t m  with 
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denominator is greater than zero, then how t m  changes with Yt depends on how  r  compares to 















<0.  Q.E.D 
  This proposition shows that as long as the average relative risk aversion for the whole 
economy is one, changes in real aggregate supply cannot affect the N-Fisher coefficient.  By the 
Consumption-Aggregate-Supply Invariance Property, the consumption allocation will not change 
unless the level of real aggregate supply changes.  Therefore, when the average relative risk - 31 - 
aversion equals one,
12 the N-Fisher coefficient will be stable and the central bank will be able to 
perfectly meet its nominal-aggregate-demand targets as long as no utility shocks occur. 
  When the average relative risk aversion of the whole economy exceeds one or is less than 
one, then changes in real aggregate supply can affect the N-Fisher coefficient.  Under these 
assumptions of non-unity average relative risk aversion, uncertainty concerning real aggregate 
supply will be reflected in instability of the N-Fisher coefficient.   Even when average relative 
risk aversion is non-unity, the only reason for instability in the N-Fisher coefficient is because of 
uncertainty in real aggregate supply.  Again, if real aggregate supply does not change and no 
utility shocks occur, then the consumption allocation cannot change as long as markets are 
complete (See the Consumption-Aggregate-Supply Invariance Property). 
We therefore conclude that if markets are complete, then the only sources of instability to 
the N-Fisher coefficient  t m  will be due either to potential utility shocks or changes in the real 
aggregate supply.  Also, potential changes in real aggregate supply can contribute to the 
instability to the N-Fisher coefficient only if the average relative risk aversion differs from one.  
This analysis then indicates a strong theoretical argument in favor of the possibility that the N-
Fisher coefficient could be relatively stable, which would mean that a central bank targeting 
nominal aggregate demand will be very successful. 










                                                 
12 The relative risk aversion associated with the logarithmic utility function is one. - 32 - 
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m .  Taking the partial derivative of the P-Fisher constant 
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the denominator is positive, the result follows.  Q.E.D. 
  This proposition shows that uncertainty concerning real aggregate supply will be 
reflected as instability in the P-Fisher coefficient.  However, the Consumption-Aggregate-Supply 
Invariance proposition still implies that only changes in real aggregate supply or utility shocks 
can cause the instability in this coefficient.  Hence, the only reasons for the central bank not 
meeting its price target is because of potential changes in real aggregate supply or utility shocks. 
 
VII. Conclusions and Reflections 
This paper discussed both theoretical and empirical issues related to central banks using 
either an interest-rate or money-supply instrument to pursue either price-level targeting or 
nominal-aggregate-demand (or nominal-income) targeting.  When prices are determined, this 
analysis applies.  Whether or not a central bank will do better setting the money supply or 
pegging the interest rate depends on the stability of velocity compared to the stability of the P-
Fisher coefficient in case of price-level targeting or the N-Fisher coefficient in the case of 
nominal-income targeting.  We found that when markets are complete, the only possible sources 
of instability in the P-Fisher and N-Fisher coefficients are possible utility shocks or possible 
changes in real aggregate supply.  If average relative risk aversion equals one, then even possible 
changes in real aggregate supply will not affect the stability of the N-Fisher coefficient and 
hence will not interfere with the central bank pursuing nominal-aggregate-demand targeting.  - 33 - 
However, regardless of the value of average relative risk aversion, changes in real aggregate 
supply will affect the stability of the P-Fisher coefficient and hence will interfere with the central 
bank pursing a price-level target. 
Empirically, we find that in the 1970s, setting the money supply would have resulted with 
better success at both price-level targeting and nominal-aggregate-demand targeting.  However, 
after 1982, pegging the interest rate would have resulted with better success, especially so for 
price-level targeting. 
Some side notes of this paper are also important to note.  In particular, we found that 
when markets are complete, consumers only will enter into nominal contracts to hedge against 
their other nominal contracts.  Because nominal contracts expose their parties to nominal risk, 
other securities will dominate nominal contracts except for nominal hedging purposes. 
A second very important side note has to do with complete markets and the role of 
monetary policy.  If markets are complete, then monetary policy can not make Pareto 
improvements to the economy since complete markets mean we already have Pareto efficiency.  
Also, if we agree that the role for monetary policy should be to make Pareto improvements in the 
economy, then that role for monetary policy must be to help complete markets.  Thus, the 
monetary economics literature should follow the lead of Eagle (2005a) and Eagle and Domian 
(2005a and 2005b) to see how monetary policy can contribute to complete markets.  Some 
monetary economists argue that we should let other financial markets complete the markets so 
that monetary policy should be left to handle what its true role should be.  Such a belief makes 
no sense since any Pareto-improving role for monetary policy must involve helping completing 
markets. - 34 - 
References 
 
David Eagle (2005a). "Completing Markets in a One-Good, Pure Exchange Economy Without 
State-Contingent Securities," Finance 0501009, Economics Working Paper Archive at WUSTL.  
David Eagle (2005b). "Price Indeterminacy Reinvented: Pegging Interest Rates While Targeting 
Prices, Inflation, or Nominal Income," Macroeconomics 0501028, Economics Working Paper 
Archive at WUSTL.  
David Eagle & Elizabeth Murff (2005). "Logical Pitfalls of Assuming Bounded Solutions to 
Expectational Difference Equations," GE, Growth, Math methods 0501002, Economics Working 
Paper Archive at WUSTL.  
David Eagle & Dale Domian (2003a). "Sounding the Alarm on Inflation Indexing and Strict 
Inflation Targeting," Macroeconomics 0312010, Economics Working Paper Archive at WUSTL. 
David Eagle & Dale Domian, (2003b). "Quasi-Real Indexing -- The Pareto-Efficient Solution to 
Inflation Indexing," Macroeconomics 0312012, Economics Working Paper Archive at WUSTL, 
revised 31 Dec 2003.  
Lucas, Robert E. (1976). “Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique,” Carnegie-Rochester 
Conference Series on Public Policy 1, 19-46. 
 
Lucas, Robert E. (1982). “Interest Rates and Currency Prices in a Two-Country World,” Journal 
of Monetary Economics, 10(3), Nov. 1982, pp. 335-359. 
 
McCallam, Bennett T.  (1981), “Price Level Determinacy with an Interest Rate Policy Rule and 
Rational Expectations,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 8:319-329.  
 
Poole, William, (1970). “Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy Instrument in a Simple Stochastic 
Macro Model,” Quarter Journal of Economics, 84(#2):197-216. 
 
Sargent, Thomas J. (1979). Macroeconomic Theory – Economic Theory, Econometrics, and 
Mathematical Economics (Academic Press – New York). 
 
Sargent, Thomas J. (1986). Dynamic Macroeconomic Theory (Harvard University Press – 
Cambridge, Massachusetts). 
 
Sargent, Thomas J. and Neil Wallace (1975). “‘Rational’ Expectations, the Optimal Monetary 
Instrument, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule,” Journal of Political Economy 83:241-254. 
 
Woodford, Michael (2003). Interest and Prices – A Foundation of a Theory of Monetary Policy 
(Princeton University Press – Princeton, New Jersey). 
 
 